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Legal Scholarship
The discussion was initiated by Professor Barbara Black of Yale Law
School. She acknowledged that history poses problems for the rationaliz-
ing enterprise in which most legal scholars engage. She suggested,
however, that only a very small, though very visible, fraction of le-
gal scholars would find their endeavors "mocked" or "menaced" by
the social and temporal contingency of law. Only those who sought to
discover universal norms-the "super-rationalizing" enterprise-would
be driven so far as consciously to adopt "evasive techniques" to avoid
the exposure of contingency. Pointing to Gordon's fourth response,
resignation, she observed that only for the few with such aims would
recognition of the complexity and richness of history be likely to con-
stitute "resignation." The vast majority of legal scholars, in contrast,
engage in valuable and fruitful middle-level theorizing, to which the
existence of social fact, historic or synchronic, could not really be
described as threatening.
In response, Gordon said that the small group of ambitious theo-
rists were not alone; the vast range of middle-level work in legal schol-
arship was also subject to the perils of historicism. Middle-level work
also seeks to rationalize, to justify, and to reform. Another legal schol-
ar from the audience agreed with Gordon's characterization of the
state of legal scholarship. He stated that he had skimmed two years of
issues of ten leading law reviews and that Gordon's description aptly
covered ninety-five percent of the articles.
A professor in the audience questioned Gordon's assertion that le-
gal scholars felt threatened by historicity. He argued that even though
they might recognize the contingency of law, they limit their own
work to the contingent rules and principles that exist at the present
time. Gordon explained that he would distinguish between an ob-
jectively present intellectual threat and something that is perceived as
a threat. Tax teachers, he agreed, do not experience Maitland as de-
stabilizing, but they might feel threatened by history if they thought
deeply about it. Of course, the conversation would stall if the scholar
said, "I'm just a tax specialist." But if one pursued the conversation
and asked, "what is the social utility of the tax system?" and, "what is
the role of lawyers in rationalizing it?", the questioner would get
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back, in increasingly large doses, an extremely contingent theory.
Once the structure of basic normative premises underlying middle-
level work has been exposed, the threat of historicism is apparent and
the avoidance mechanisms can be identified.
A scholar from the audience questioned Gordon's assertion that
history is radically destabilizing and that it threatens the rationaliz-
ing enterprise. He agreed that the rationalizing effort is a response
to contingency; it begins with the recognition that a problem exists
and should be explored. Reason-giving is threatened by history, how-
ever, only if it attempts to be universal. Otherwise, he suggested, it
is not necessary for the recognition of historical contingency to threat-
en the concept of rationality. Gordon responded with an analogy to
scientific knowledge. The publication of Kuhn's work on the struc-
ture of scientific revolutions1 had thrown scientists into a panic. It
suggested to them, "All we're doing is constructing paradigms, no
one of which is more true than another." Similarly, in Gordon's view,
the contingency of legal principles is inherently threatening to legal
scholarship. He challenged the members of the audience to consider
the possibility that their own work, in twenty years, would come to
be seen as an apologetic for the current social order.
Speaking from his own experience in teaching legal history, a law
professor observed that most persons do not perceive history as very
threatening. Reading a history of prisons and plantations in the early
nineteenth century in South Carolina may suggest that these institu-
tions were used to stigmatize marginal groups, but it does not sug-
gest more troubling conclusions. Gordon agreed that, for this reason,
legal history is often unsatisfying to teach. People don't use it the
way it should be used. Students readily understand that nineteenth
century law served a legitimating function for the existing social or-
der, but they do not turn the same critical analysis upon their own
law. He wishes that the menace of historicity were more acutely and
painfully felt.
Responding to Gordon's observation about the decline of legal his-
tory in the law schools in the early twentieth century, and to Pro-
fessor Horwitz's comments, an academic in the audience suggested a
functional explanation for the decline. Legal history was useful at
the end of the nineteenth century, he suggested, because it helped
lawyers understand the law. For example, medieval studies could
help lawyers straighten out problems in the common law of real prop-
1. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTI"IC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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erty. But the situation changed as statutes were passed and more
and more areas of law were reformed. Legal history became irrele-
vant to professional lawyers. On the other hand, with the rise of pro-
fessionalization, other historians felt themselves unequipped to do
legal history.
Gordon responded that the functionalist account of the rise and
fall of legal history was a prime example of adaptation theory, an,'
one that was not supported by the facts. Gordon's own research sug-
gested that, in fact, the basic conditions had not changed. Lawyers
in the 1870s and 1880s made little use of legal history. The role of
legal history changed not because of a change in circumstances but
because of a change in people's view of the past. In a deep and mys-
terious way, the paradigms of useful knowledge changed. Moreover,
in the past decade, legal history has enjoyed a considerable revival
in the law schools, not correlated in any way to the functional im-
portance of the subject to the legal profession.
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